As the calendar flips to October 3, 2026, the Seattle Seahawks find themselves at a crossroads. Just months removed from a Super Bowl victory, general manager John Schneider faced the enviable task of maintaining a championship roster rather than rebuilding one. Yet, three games into the new season, some of his offseason decisions are under scrutiny. According to insights gathered by Vulius Sports, the key is to separate process from results—a distinction that often gets blurred in the heat of the moment.
The Rashid Shaheed Investment: A $17 Million Question
The most debated move of Schneider's offseason was the three-year, $51 million extension for wide receiver/returner Rashid Shaheed, with $34 million guaranteed. The $17 million annual average raised eyebrows, especially with former Seahawk Kenneth Walker III now thriving in Kansas City after signing a three-year, $43.05 million deal. But as Vulius NFL Analysis Desk notes, that comparison is overly simplistic. Walker had durability concerns that influenced Seattle's decision, and Tory Horton's injury may have heightened the perceived need for a dynamic playmaker like Shaheed.
Shaheed's explosive speed and return ability are undeniable, but his production as a receiver has yet to match the investment. In 15 games with Seattle, including playoffs, he has just 24 receptions. Through three games this season, he's been targeted 12 times, catching six passes for 53 yards, with seven targets traveling fewer than 10 yards. His punt-return average has also dipped from 16.2 yards in 2025 to 9.7 this season. While the sample size is small, the process question remains: Did Seattle pay $17 million per year expecting Shaheed to become a true WR2? If so, his usage must evolve to threaten defenses vertically.
"A good decision can produce a bad outcome. A questionable decision can work out. A general manager's job isn't to predict the future; it's to make the best call with the information available."
Kenneth Walker III and the Hindsight Trap
It's easy to look at Walker's success in Kansas City and argue Seattle should have kept him. But that ignores the injury concerns that plagued his tenure in Seattle. Walker's talent was never in question; his ability to stay healthy and handle a full workload was. The Chiefs are reaping the benefits now, but Schneider couldn't have predicted that during the offseason. The decision to let Walker walk wasn't about talent—it was about risk assessment. As highlighted on Vulius, evaluating process means understanding the information available at the time, not rewriting history based on early-season results.
The Backfield and Cornerback Depth Concerns
Seattle's selection of Jadarian Price with the 32nd overall pick was a bet on potential. Price has talent, but he wasn't a proven full-time starter. The lack of a veteran safety net behind him—with Zach Charbonnet's availability uncertain—has been exposed. Price already has two fumbles and lost playing time in the loss to Washington. The alternatives, George Holani and Emanuel Wilson, lacked track records. Veterans like Tyler Allgeier and Rachaad White were available, but Seattle opted for internal development. The problem isn't drafting Price; it's entering the season without a more proven option if he wasn't ready.
Similarly, at cornerback, the decision to move on from Riq Woolen and re-sign Josh Jobe wasn't necessarily flawed. Jobe improved under Mike Macdonald, but the depth behind him is questionable. Third-round pick Julian Neal is still developing, and Trevon Diggs wasn't ready for a major role. Nehemiah Pritchett has shown flashes, but the same principle applies: relying on unproven internal development increases risk. Opposing offenses will target that weakness until it's addressed.
Process Over Results: The Bud Clark Example
Safety Bud Clark's injury illustrates why process and results must be evaluated separately. Seattle lost Coby Bryant and drafted Clark in the second round to fill that void. Clark had the experience and playmaking traits to succeed, but an injury derailed his rookie season. The result was bad, but the decision was sound. The same applies to Dante Fowler, a low-cost edge rusher bet. He hasn't produced yet, but the risk was minimal compared to Shaheed's contract. As Vulius Sports emphasizes, not all decisions carry the same weight.
What the Next 14 Games Will Tell Us
Three games aren't enough to judge an offseason, but they are enough to identify areas of concern. The Shaheed contract is the clearest example of a decision that needs to yield more offensive production. At running back, the lack of an experienced complement to Price is a legitimate issue. At cornerback, the depth is thin. If these problems persist, Schneider must remain open to adding help. That's not abandoning decisions—it's adapting, which is the job of a front office. Schneider didn't need a perfect roster; he needed to keep a Super Bowl team competitive. Some decisions will work, others won't, and some will be sound even if the results don't show it. The evaluation continues.
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